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there is prolixity in much of this which would irk most readers. The atmosphere of the seminary lingers around it.

The definition of epistemological terms has been carried out very successfully. I have found the scholastic terminology well adapted for essential distinctions. Thus, such expressions as "*esse ideale*," "*esse intentionale*" and "*medium quo, in quo, per quod res cognoscitur*" are valuable. In harmony with this tradition of exactitude is the care with which various positions are named and classified. Berkeley's philosophy is described as acosmic or hyperphysical idealism; Hume's as pan-phenomenism, *etc.*

I am inclined to think that readers will find Chapters IX., X., and XI. the most interesting in this volume. The difference between modern and medieval nominalism is well brought out.

Volume II. falls into two parts, dealing with the problem of our knowledge of the external world, and with the criteria of truth, respectively. It is interesting to note that Jeannière defends mediate sense perception while Coffey argues for perceptionism. It would seem that, while scholasticism is consistently realistic, it is divided into these two camps. I must confess that I have more sympathy with mediatism. The *parti pris* of the writer comes to the surface in his treatment of evolutionary relativism.

This book is a scholarly piece of work and gives one a high opinion of the training given in the better Catholic seminaries. Yet one is constantly aware of the anti-naturalistic assumptions within which it is developed. It is practically taken for granted that intellectual capacities can have no evolutionary origin. But, until the mind-body problem is satisfactorily solved by modern science and philosophy, the naturalist can only point out his divergence.

R. W. SELLARS.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. March, 1918. *Psychology in Relation to the War*: MAJOR ROBERT M. YERKES (pp. 85-115).—Report of the work done by psychologists during the year 1917 in relation to the war. *An Experiment in Employment Psychology*: HENRY C. LINK (pp. 116-127):—The purpose of the experiment was to discover a set of tests which would guide the employment section of the Winchester Repeating Arms Company in selecting candidates for "shell inspection" and for "gauging shells for minimum and maximum head thickness." Eight tests were used. *Associative Aids: I. Their Relation to Learning, Retention, and Other*

Associations: H. B. REED (pp. 128-155).—The relation of the rate of learning to the rate of forgetting depends upon three conditions: (1) the character of the measure; (2) the character of the learning; (3) the character of the material. The distribution of the types of associative aids and of errors in learning has little agreement with that for free association because the former are a form of controlled association. *Simultaneous versus Successive Association*: SVEN FROEBERG (pp. 156-163).—Simultaneity of two experiences is not necessary for an association to be formed between them. An association may still be formed between two experiences where the first has already passed out of consciousness when the second one appears. *Discussion*: Miss Calkins's case of self against soul: MARY S. CASE, J. E. CREIGHTON, and MARY WHITON CALKINS (pp. 164-169). Espinoza, Roberto. *La Evolucion Democratica*. Santiago: Hume y Walker. 1918. Pp. viii + 350.

Koller, Armin Hajman. *The Theory of Environment. Part I.* Menasha, Wis.: George Bant Publishing Co. Pp. 104. \$1.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

To the Editors of the Journal of Philosophy:

I HAVE read with much interest Dr. Bode's *Consciousness as Behavior*,¹ in which he refers to certain parts of my article on *Behavior* previously published.² I find myself in the main in agreement with Dr. Bode's remarks in regard to interpretation. I may note, however, that if a lover were to limit his consideration of James's "automatic sweetheart" to an objective view, as he should properly do if he were a behaviorist, I fear he would find it difficult to accommodate his acts to hers. His knowledge of the workings of the complex organic system under observation is altogether inadequate to point the way to such accommodations.

If, however, he assumes that all special changes in her behavior correspond with equally special changes in her consciousness; then the discovery, by indirect interpretation, of certain changes in her consciousness may enable him to make accommodative changes in his own consciousness which will correspond with accommodative future acts of his own.

This, however, is apart from the point I had hoped to make clear. I may put it in the form of a question. Does Dr. Bode hold, or does he not hold, that "Consciousness . . . is just a future adaptation that has been set to work to bring about its own realization"?³ It

¹ This *JOURNAL*, Vol. XV., p. 449.

² This *JOURNAL*, Vol. XV., p. 258.

³ Cf. *Creative Intelligence*, p. 244. Italics mine.